

Dependent Nationalism: The People and Territory in the Chinese Inward Defense

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Abstract

The National Defense Act passed by the National People's Congress of March 1997 may well cause controversy due to its incompatibility with norms of Western sovereign states. Indeed Chinese national defense is inward defense to the extent that it aims to prevent a harmonious social being from splitting. From a postcolonial perspective, I believe that the hybrid influences in the Chinese public consciousness have cause enormous anxiety among Chinese leaders. Since the enemy resides within, it is impossible to speak strictly of territorially oriented national defense. Inward defense is nevertheless considered so undemocratic that it defeats the purpose of having sovereignty to protect citizens from external threat. However, inward defense exists in all states albeit indirect in Western states. The nature of inward defense enables the Chinese military to ironically lose or relinquish territory with a feeling of superiority, or display a compulsive attachment to a piece of land regardless of the sacrifices required. All this performance, in the end, enacts a position of moral incorruptibility with a spirit reaching far and beyond secular territory, therefore reproducing a difference that distinguishes the Chinese from the imperialist Other.

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Introduction

After brief, symbolic discussions, National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China passed the National Defense Act during its annual session in March 1997. The Act reflects an interesting state of mind unfamiliar to the outside world; namely, there is an unambiguous emphasis on what can be called inward defense. According to the Act, one of the major functions of national defense in the PRC is to prevent any potential split of the nation from arising internally, a mission that immediately incurs concerns from observers in Taiwan where a separatist movement has been gaining increasing ground in the past decade.¹ Similarly, this concern over internal subversion in association with some unnamed external enemy recalls the Tiananmen incident of June 4, 1989 where the People's Liberation Army forcefully stopped a rare pro-democracy rally.

A more recent example would include the military actions across the Taiwan Straits in 1995 and 1996. Warning against any potential international interference in the Taiwan Straits, Beijing launched a number of missile exercises to assert its sovereign claim over Taiwan upon the suspected separatist maneuvers of Taipei.² In addition, in the transition of Hong Kong's sovereignty back to China on July 1, 1997, despite the warning from London that the PLA entering Hong Kong would cause local anxiety, the PLA nonetheless went on the ground that there could be subversive elements in Hong Kong. With the PLA arriving, Deng Xiaoping argued that those who may have thought of creating troubles would naturally think twice.³ By its much broader definition of national defense, this Act therefore could target those whom national

¹ For example, Kuo-hsing Chen, "Caution Called upon the Pass of China's National Defense Act" (*dui zhongguo zhiding guofang fa ying you de jingti*), *Taiwan Times* (March 10, 1997): 4.

² For different perspectives on the exercises, see Forum, *The China Journal* (July 1997): 87-134.

³ For further information, see Chinese Communist Party Center Literature Commission (ed.), *Selected Work of Deng Xiaoping, III* (*deng xiaoping wen xuan*) (Beijing: People's Press, 1994), p.72-76.

defense, in its conventional definition, is meant to protect.

Inward defense is a concept seldom heard in the Western defense circles. In fact, this notion of inward defense may well arouse anxiety from outside observers as it seemingly contradicts the meaning of national defense.⁴ Indeed studies of national defense invariably center around the protection of national territories in times of foreign intrusion while the National Defense Act provides the legal basis for the PLA to engage in military actions against its own civilians. Contrary to the territorially oriented national defense concepts in the West, I argue that national defense in postcolonial China responds to an anxiety about disharmony in society, where human relationships are guided by Confucianism, Daoism, or even Maoism. Not only because territorially-oriented defense in the past would have indicated the moral decay of an emperor, but contemporary Beijing authorities also cannot entertain the idea of a Great Chinese civilization being territorially contained, hence reiteration of China's modality for third world countries.⁵ Nonetheless, since the failure of the Boxers' Rebellion (1899-1900) whereby the Allied Forces of eight countries completely demoralized the Chinese dynastic court, the fixation to obtain a correct human relationship among all Chinese has evolved into an obsessive pursuit of a unified front in the face of imperialist intrusion.

In brief, while national defense presupposes the existence of a permanent threat outside of Chinese sovereign borders, inward defense aims to prevent a harmonious social being from splitting. Without such a social entity, national defense, which juxtaposes external threat and internal order, would lose its bearings. Inward defense therefore refers to the mechanism that justifies as well as practices the prevention of dissident voices from arising within sovereign borders. Accordingly, national defense, by targeting external enemies, inevitably presupposes, in an ultimate sense, a united social order which territorial boundaries

⁴ For legal provisions concerning the domestic use of national defense force, see *China Times Zhongguo Shibao* (March 4, 1997): 9.

⁵ See, for example, Philip Snow, *The Star Raft: China's Encounter with Africa* (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988), pp.69-104.

define.

Consequently, the contemporary Chinese identity is less defined by one's relationship with the Emperor, as Son of Underheaven, than with the Chinese nation in its confrontation with an invading imperialist Other. Although this defensive mentality has led the Chinese military in both the Republic and the People's Republic periods to defend the territorial borders to which the Chinese people consider themselves entitled, the military's practices continue to demonstrate that national defense embraces essentially an introspective state of mind.⁶ It is not merely a material, objective capacity for sovereign, excluding power; rather, it is a determined search for a path to return to a pure national identity no longer extant. As a result, the Chinese military could ironically lose or surrender territory with a feeling of superiority, or display a compulsive attachment to a piece of land regardless of the sacrifices required. All this performance, in the end, enacts a position of moral incorruptibility with a spirit reaching far beyond secular territory, therefore reproducing a difference that distinguishes the Chinese from the imperialist Other. Ironically, Chinese nationalism that supports this difference becomes itself highly dependent on the maintenance of that difference. The discursive circle thus formed perpetuates imperialism through national defensive mobilization and, in turn, reproduces nationalism through the presumed presence of imperialism.

A Historicist Reading of National Defense

It is not possible or not easy to provide a full account of Chinese national defense behavior without referring to the recent critical literature on sovereignty. Unfortunately, mainstream research on Chinese external behavior has yet to establish a dialogue with a number of nascent schools of thoughts. Postmodern,⁷ feminist⁸ as well as postcolonial⁹ writers have

⁶ Jonathan Adelman and Chih-yu Shih, *Symbolic War: The Chinese Use of Force, 1840-1980* (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 1993).

⁷ See James and Der Derian and Michael Shapiro eds., *International/Intertextual Relations* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989); Jim George, *Discourses of Global*

one after another questioned foreign policy studies that take the notion of sovereignty as given and therefore exercise it to the disadvantage of those living in the border areas, physically as well as conceptually.¹⁰ Indeed the sovereign order which assumes a chaotic outside world cannot persist without each country preparing for a defense against some external enemy.¹¹ If there is no enemy outside, there is no need of sovereignty, nor national defense. Especially for an immigrant society such as the United States, an enemy outside is particularly important in that immigrants belonging to a nascent, imagined community can avoid the awkward national identity question by sticking together in the face of a common enemy.¹² National defense, which perpetuates the feeling of being threatened, sustains the nation discursively rather than physically.

Postmodern critics hold that diplomacy, which supposedly manages mutually exclusive sovereign relations, is in fact both a product and a reproducer of mutual estrangement among sovereign nation states.¹³ The unstated position that people represented by diplomats are one harmonious whole is obviously unattainable, but when disputes among sovereign actors are heated, the presumption of harmony, i.e. solidarity, gains strength. As a result, forces that contradict the harmony assumption

Politics (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994); Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

⁸ V. Spike Peterson, *Feminist (Re) Visions of International Relations Theory* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992); Ann Tickner, *Gender in International Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992); Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

⁹ Lily Ling, "Democratization under Internationalization," *Democratization* 3, 2 (1996); Shih, "A Postcolonial Reading of Cross-Strait Relations," *The Journal of Contemporary China* 17 (January 1998); Sankaran Krishna, "The Improvement of Being Ironic," *Alternatives* 18 (1993): 385-417; David Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah "Knowing Encounters", in Yosef Lapid and Frieddrich Kratochwil (eds.), *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996).

¹⁰ Michael J. Shapiro and Hayward R. Alker (eds.), *Challenging Boundaries* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995); Keith Krause, and Michael C. Williams (eds.), *Critical Security Studies* ((Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).

¹¹ R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

¹² David Campbell, *Writing Security* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992)

¹³ James Der Derian, *On Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1987); *Anti-diplomacy* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992).

become elements of anti-diplomacy for it defies the very foundation of the sovereign binary of order inside versus chaos outside. Similarly, all national defense behavior is a necessary act of mutual estrangement and forces which contradict the harmony assumption are anti-defense. Anti-defense is much more serious than anti-diplomacy because, unlike the discursive nature of diplomacy, national defense is physically as well as discursively demanding loyalty from those encompassed by it.

Sovereignty-based national defense, which the world almost universally practices today, nonetheless requires more efforts to implement in China than in the Western nation-state system. This is because national defense based on territorial security is historically a product of Western sovereign order. For in the earlier Chinese hierarchical world, where a celestial court ruled universally, no secular leaders possessed the authority of excluding others; leaders were leaders because they embodied people's heart, nor could they discriminate on a territorial basis. All were subjects of the sovereignty of a morally or religiously supreme being. In contrast and by definition, the goal of modern sovereign defense is to protect the nation from foreign intrusion. An imagined enemy becomes critical in that the national defense establishment must decide upon or justify the amount of resources sufficient for the defense build-up. A balance must be struck between the unlikely prospect that a nation can prepare itself to fight all the countries in the rest of the world, and the risk of under-investment in the defense sector.¹⁴ In addition, to have each individual citizen investing in their own defense on the market would be obviously inefficient, for rarely would a nation face simultaneous attacks from all directions. National defense thus conceived is predicated on three assumptions, which reinforce one another, yet none is familiar to traditional Chinese thinking: clear national borders to be defended, an imagined enemy or group of enemies, and professionalism. For example, if no defined borders exists, there could be no enemy located outside of national borders; if no professionalism exists to guard borders, resources cross borders at will to the effect of downplaying borders; if there is no imagined enemy, why

¹⁴ Lewis F. Richardson, *Armaments and Security* (Pittsburgh: The Boxwood Press, 1960).

would one need professional defense?

Indeed no exaggerated image of the enemy could occur in a cultural vacuum. The construction of any imagined enemies relies upon certain psycho-cultural foundations to appear real for the citizen-defenders. One component of these foundations deals with the specific political context of the defending nation. For example, the specification of the USSR as the enemy of the United States emerged partially as a product of the US self-image as a capitalist, democratic country, yet the perception of socialism's evil and its fundamental confrontation with capitalism takes place outside the conventional definitions of national defense.¹⁵ Therefore, the defense sectors cannot help but reproduce the image of a Soviet threat actually created by politicians' and society's ideologies.

At another, deeper level, national defense reflects a profound need of anyone acting in the name of the state to consider its external environment to be filled with hostility.¹⁶ As a matter of fact, the origins of sovereign states can be traced back to a number of religious wars. Sovereignty as a theory grants a prince the right to determine to which religion his state would subscribe. Sovereignty of the people later replaced sovereignty embodied in the prince as capitalism and democracy overthrew the monarchy. Not much change occurred, though, in terms of the external hostility each civilized state faced except that it was no longer the Dark Ages, the city of Gods, the heresy, etc., but the authoritarian, socialist, feudalist regimes. National defense in the West is supposed to prevent these regimes from engaging in any external intervention.

This second level provided the persistent motivation for States in the modern era to search for enemies outside of territorial boundaries.¹⁷ Earlier colonialism reflected this mentality by establishing colonies for

¹⁵ David S. Landes, "Some Thoughts on the Natures of Economic Imperialism," *Journal of Economic History* 21 (1961): 496-512.

¹⁶ David Campbell, *Writing Security* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992).

¹⁷ R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

religious as well as secular reasons, forgetting that often these reasons were themselves mutually incompatible throughout the European history. As a result, secular expansion of capitalism and missionary movement to spread religion together promoted colonialism and eventually caused World War I among the contending colonial masters. Germany, demoralizing after the war and struggling to breathe in their imagined “living space,” cooperated with Japan determining to throw all white races out of Asia. Both acted in the name of establishing a rightful boundary, i.e. a “living space” for Germany and the Great East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere for Japan, to camouflage the racist sentiment.

National defense as a mechanism to secure an enemy for the European states survived after World War II. Colonies gained independent statehood one after another, providing increased anxiety toward the possibility that their immaturity would expose them to the co-option or coercion by one's enemy. The US national defense, for example, also must therefore defend the borders of its strategic post-colonial allies.¹⁸ Actions that targeted domestic groups of these allies exemplified a kind of inward defense that occurred outside of the US borders but within the confinement of the borders, which the US national defense claims to protect.¹⁹ Inward defense of one's own ally thus secured the sense of an enemy's threat to oneself. This is especially true for a global sovereign power such as the US.

The practices of inward defense by an allied state incur anxiety for the American people as to the meaning of national defense. Inward defense allows a government to impose terror on its people and violates democratic principles, which justify the existence of national defense against potential threats posed by external authoritarian regimes. There develops the need to overly stress the threat of the enemy said to be in collusion with the targets of inward defense in the ally-states, be they the fifth column, the communist rebels, or simply dissident intellectuals. With

¹⁸ Cynthia Weber, *Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State and Symbolic Intervention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), Ch. 1.

¹⁹ Stanley Hoffmann, *Duties beyond Borders* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981).

the power of religious and capitalist ideologies, the US government seemed to have worried its own people much less than an allied state's citizens, who were believed to be dependent, traditional, and weak, and hence vulnerable to subversion.

In other words, there is a fundamental difference in the approach Western states adopt to sovereign borders. Sovereign borders for them are protective shields against external threats of human rights violation, but coming to the non-Western states, sovereign borders appear to be a way of covering up human rights violation. Indeed all this discursive practice of distrust toward non-Western sovereignties justifies, yet also undermines, the sovereign order. For a non-Western state such as China, national defense is harder since their sovereignty is imbedded in a historically essentially and fundamentally different concept and multi-ethnic society, but easier with the identification of external imperialist intervention appearing as a real threat.

Contemporary inward defense emerged from the expansion of Western civilization. Newly independent states began this awareness of national defense implanted during their colonial legacy. Their definition of national defense and their enemies naturally received heavy influence from their former colonial masters. However, these states became states without sharing a common religious or cultural root as their European counterparts had. The European sense of common roots was embodied in a shared anxiety toward a certain external interference. As the symbol of a typical European state changed from the Prince to the citizens, the perceived external threat concomitantly shifts from being the church to colonial competitors, communists, and more recently authoritarian regimes. Today any state that does not share the same respect for the citizens' subjective position, primarily defined in property and participatory rights, threatens the Western states.²⁰ This emphasis on the civic culture does not exist in the newly independent states, including China.²¹

²⁰ E.H. Carr, *Nationalism and After* (New York: Macmillan, 1945).

²¹ D.A.Bell, D. Brown, K. Jayasuriya and D.M. Jones (eds.), *Towards Illiberal*

Many newly sovereign states won independence through war with their colonial masters or their neighbors. The colonial master is simultaneously both friend and enemy since colonialism assists in defining the path of future national development, yet in spirit denies equal sovereign status to its former colony. The obscurity of national identity in many of these states creates ambiguity along the national borders drawn by the former master. For newly independent states, therefore, the national defense issue is intrinsically a national identity issue, and thus an internal issue from the European perspective. Once national defense becomes an internal identity issue, the military unavoidably enters in all political struggles, damaging its professionalism and credibility in specifying the imagined enemy for the whole country,²² whose borders were arbitrarily drawn by colonialism.

However, internal defense is not restricted to the newly independent states. Domestically, Western states have derived a kind of internal defense, though in a more indirect manner. Colonialism historically absorbed a great number of immigrants whose descendants have generally acquired citizenship in the master country generations later. Many of these immigrants left home unwillingly and were regarded at best as secondary citizens. The immigration actually continues into the current postcolonial ages. Collectively, they easily become scapegoats of the mainstream particularly when things go wrong.²³ Chinese immigrants, for example, evoked the image of Yellow Peril more than once in modern US history. Now inside one's borders, these religiously, culturally, ideologically and socially different classes of people naturally care for their home lands and thus are considered as potential external threats due to their pledge of nationalism or socialism. They become the targets of inward national defense for the Western capitalist states.²⁴

Democracy in Pacific Asia (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995).

²² See, for example, Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

²³ Editors, *Selected Historical Documents on Yellow Peril* (huanghuo lun lishi ziliao xuan ji) (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1979).

²⁴ Bigo Didier, "Security, Borders and the State," in A. Sweedler and J Scott (eds.), *Border Regions in Functional Transition* (Berlin: Institute of Regional Development,

Since their native countries are now typically non-Christian, authoritarian, and sometimes socialist states which are themselves portrayed as, or at least vulnerable to, an enemy, the decedents of people originally from these countries unavoidably subvert the integrity of the colonial master states by simply residing inside of them. American Indians, Africans, Chinese and Japanese experienced similar discrimination in different historical periods. Globalization at the end of the 20th century has led to deeper identity crises within both the immigrant groups and the mainstream societies.²⁵ The drive to clarify or even purify one's own identity continues to obscure the national boundaries upon which national defense build-up rests. Globalization detracts from the amount of loyalty a national identity can claim and diverts resources a national government can control. This trend exacerbates the concern over the likelihood of foreign intrusion in a non-military form.²⁶ The notion of national defense concomitantly broadened to include issues such as the war on drugs, trade merchandise dumping, and foreign political contributions. Conceptually unprepared for this change, national defense sectors are perhaps compelled to extreme exaggeration of the threat imposed by an imagined enemy.

The Passivity of Chinese National Defense

First of all, the ambiguous relationship between nationalism and state sovereignty in modern China helps to explain about China's mal-adaptation to the sovereign order. Since the Republican Revolution of 1911, there has been a tendency to define Chinese nationalism in terms of patriotism, an middle ground between nationalism and the sovereign order.²⁷ Yet the Chinese defense of sovereignty has clearly been motivated by anti-foreignism, which is neither liberal nor Christian in

IRS, 1996)

²⁵ Ole Barru Bizab Waever, Morton Kelstrup and Pieere Lematire, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).

²⁶ Stelin Siglev, *The Empire of the Dragon (long de diguo)* (Taipei: Think Tank, 1996).

²⁷ Michael H. Hunt, "Chinese National Identity and the Strong State: The Late-Qing-Republican Crisis," in L. Dittmer and S. Kim (eds.), *China's Quest for National Identity* (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp.62-79.

nature. In addition, this anti-foreignism presupposes a Chinese national that is in actuality torn among different ethnic groups as well as people with different foreign connections. The construction of a modern Chinese nation is thus discursively dependent on the notion of sovereignty.²⁸ However, this address of sovereign concerns leaves people's feelings an irrelevant issue. The emphasis is inevitably on strength and authority, something Chinese are historically reluctant to express.

Consequently, the meaning of sovereignty in China falls back on one ultimate, familiar task - people's final awakening - and because of this aspiration, family, society and the emergence of the Chinese sovereign state are morally indivisible, as a postcolonial writer notes:

[T]he solution to the problem posed by the multileveled structure of family-state-nation-society would come about as a natural result of humanity's "repentance from the origin, amelioration of error and fresh start" and thus "renovate his heart and blood entirely, in order to renew the moral quality."²⁹

Accordingly, the Anti-Confucian campaign in the name of scientism in the early Republican period was essentially not Westernization as it may have appeared; the whole purpose of the Westernization school was to enable China to defend itself against Western intruders. In addition, the movement's contents involved "aspects of morality," "family and state system," and "the future of mankind."³⁰ To do this, reformers demanded that all traditional elements be modernized first. Unfortunately as a result, modernization appeared to be Westernization, dividing those involved in the nation-building into several camps. Westernizers and China-firsters accused each other of the moral crime of the worst kind. Interestingly, the

²⁸ See the discussion in Michael Hunt, *The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) and Chih-yu Shih, "A Postcolonial Reading of Cross-Taiwan Strait Relations," *Journal of Contemporary China* 5, 17 (January 1998).

²⁹ Wang Hui, "The Fate of 'Mr. Science' in China: The Concept of Science and Its Application in Modern Chinese Thought," in Tani Barlow (ed.), *Formations of Colonial Modernity in East Asia* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), p.56.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.52.

same fear of internal enemy continues to drag down Chinese defense reformers in the 1990s even if the so-called Westernizers are rare in China, as one People's Liberation Army-related publisher prints in the aftermath of the Tiananmen crackdown:

[The imperialist forces] substitute contacts for containment, interaction for blockade, thought infiltration for open subversion, nurturing of internal forces of change for external military, political intervention. If fire can burn people to death, water can also drown people to death... Struggles seem to have lessened on the surface, but have escalated to a more intense and complex level in reality.³¹

Secondly, the beginning of the modern Chinese state did not entirely model that of other postcolonial states in a number of ways. To begin with, no such dominant colonial power existed in China to the extent that the subsequent building of Chinese sovereignty could not possibly follow the path laid down by one external master. In contrast to the colonial legacy elsewhere, therefore, the specification of just one external enemy was not enough for solidifying a united nation. In addition, the sheer mass of the Chinese territory disallowed colonial powers from dividing and ruling its entirety. There remained a strong, indigenous voice in China that never succumbed to the colonial powers.³² The subsequent independence claimed by the Chinese after the Republican revolution of 1911 posed a particular threat to the extant sovereign states in that the assimilation of the Republic into the European sovereign state system seemed unlikely to succeed.³³ For the Chinese, the construction of a Chinese identity was not to clarify relationships against just one colonial master, but to expel them all.³⁴ Nonetheless, each former colonial power

³¹ Hanlong Zhuang and Ming Yang, *Historical Discourse on the Strategy of Peaceful Evolution in the West (xifang heping yanbian zhanlyue shi hua)* (Beijing: Long March Publisher, 1991), pp.119-120.

³² Tani Barlow, "Introduction," in T. Barlow (ed.), *Formations of Colonial Modernity in East Asia* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), p.8.

³³ For a related theme of Awakening Lion, see Jianfei Qin, *The World Views China (shijie de zhongguo guan)* (Shanghai: Xuelin, 1992).

³⁴ Kuan-sheng Liao, *Anti-Foreignism and Modernization in China, 1860-1980* (New

could identify certain forces within the Chinese sovereign borders to be their faithful agents. China's total expulsion approach thus encountered enormous difficulty from within.

The concerns over internal disagreement probably explains why the late Premier Zhou Enlai once claimed and retired Foreign Minister Qian Qichen repeated that a good diplomat must first clean his own house before inviting a guest.³⁵ These are not just thoughts of diplomats, past and present. Under the pressure that the Chinese people must show unity in the face of imperialism, apprehension about internal disagreement often escalates into one about subversion, which has been the fundamental national security issue in China up till the 21st century. Extreme views articulated by the leftists in the mid-1990s deserve attention in this regard for their widely circulated work--Ten Thousand Words I, II, III, IV--recalls a kind of discourse familiar to perhaps all Chinese politicians and intellectuals since the first Foreign Affair Movement (*yangwu yundong*) in the 1860s. Volumes I and II directly discuss national security issues, entitled "Certain Factors Affecting Our National Security" (1995), and "Preliminary Study of External and Internal Environments and Major Threats to Our National Security in the Ten to Twenty Years to Come" (1996) respectively.³⁶

The four factors mentioned in the first volume are property structure, class relations, social consciousness and the condition of the ruling party, none of which is the subject of mainstream national security research, be it sovereignty-related or enemy-driven. The second volume divides national security threats into two groups: those jeopardizing the interests of the Chinese nation and those jeopardizing the social system; it lists four categories of fundamental threats: a new cold war offense, internal peaceful evolution, separatism, and territorial disputes, with peaceful

York: St. Martin's Press, 1984).

³⁵ Qichen Qian, "Seriously Studying Zhou Enlai's Diplomatic Thoughts and Practices," in Pei Jianzhang (ed.), *Studying Zhou Enlai: Diplomatic Thoughts and Practices* (*yanjiu zhou enlai--waijiao sixiang yu shijian*) (Beijing: World Knowledge, 1989), p.1.

³⁶ These documents and responses to them are collected in Liuzi Shih (ed.) *The Ten-thousand-word and Other Underground Writings in Beijing* (*beijing dixia wan yan shu*) (Hong Kong: Mirrow Books, 1997).

evolution considered “the key.” Eight forces leading to these threats are described as:

1. Western anti-Chinese, anti-communist forces;
2. local hegemonism and expansionism along the borders;
3. separatist and anti-communist forces in Taiwan and Hong Kong;
4. Overseas and domestic antagonistic forces and nationalist separatists...;
5. Bourgeois liberals in the Party;
6. Corrupt elements in the Party and the regime as well as local patriarchalism and bureaucratic forces;
7. Nascent bourgeoisie who attempt to resist proletarian leadership or change socialism;
- and 8. Serious criminal, economic criminals and ugly social developments.

Thirdly, the Dao discourse in traditional Chinese politics, compared with tangible territorial sovereignty, is highly abstract and necessarily boundary crossing. Dao is an expression of sincere regard for people's welfare, a spirit of selflessness, and capacity for empathy. Chinese Confucians, Legalists as well as Daoists all speak of the spirit of Dao when dealing with issues concerning national unity.³⁷ The universal nature of Dao prescribes that a prince should win people's hearts but warns against the open use of coercion and rewards lest this would tarnish the supreme incorruptibility of a prince. People's hearts remain the sole judgment of a prince's legitimacy. As a corollary, all enemies are internal, for it must be the prince's misconduct that has alienated people's hearts or lost the respect of the outsiders. The solution lies in the rectification of mind, referring to the return of everyone to their rightful roles.

In fact, a certain reading of people's hearts may compel national leaders to take drastic move as Empress Dowager explained to Li Hongzhang, the major modernizer of the Qing Dynasty, that upon seeing the people's heart in Peking she had no alternative but to declare war on

³⁷ See the discussion by Ta-ning Hsie, “The Origin and the Contents of the Great Unity Conception” (da yitong guannian de lai yuan ji qi nei rong), presented at the Conference on Prospects and Retrospects, annual meeting of the Association for Unity and Self-strengthening (Taipei), January 4, 1998.

all the treaty countries during the Boxers' Rebellion at the last turn of the century. In fact, the debate at the Qing court on the eve of war was precisely one of how reliable as the people's heart. The hawks stressed the imperative mandate of the people's hearts while the doves suspected its utility.³⁸ A different reading of the people's heart may on the other hand lead national leaders to adopt particular defense strategies as Chiang Kaishek called for the building of a Great Wall of the people's hearts during the second Sino-Japanese War in the 1930s upon the retreat of his troops. He said:

The final victory... relies upon the broadly based and unified hearts of the people in the countryside. My people of the countryside clearly understand that it is unavoidable that the enemy will swallow [land]..., [but] the forty million square li of our nation's land can be build into a strong wall of defense, both tangible and intangible.³⁹

Since colonialism became an unbearable burden upon the Chinese sense of superiority, expulsion of the White race has occupied the agenda of all Chinese national leaders, who disagreed with one another over how soon and through which practical measures the expulsion should be executed. Having been a countermove in the face of imperialist and colonial invasion, this expulsion approach by no means released the people from attending to the issue of people's hearts.⁴⁰

The National defense establishment provides a conceptual tool of transforming this internal enemy into one outside of territorial borders. Even there, the Daoist legacy remains strong. For example, the troops are the "people's liberation" army, and the troops sent to Korea in 1950 were the "people's voluntary" army. The justification of sending troops was

³⁸ Ah Ying, "On the National Crisis of the Year of Geng Zi," (*geng zi guo bian ji*) in Editors (eds.), *Literature on the Incident of the Year of Gengzi* (*gengzi shijian wenxian ji*) (Beijing: Chinese Bookstore, 1959), pp.947-951.

³⁹ Hsiang-hsiang Wu, *The History of the Second Sino-Japanese War* (*di erci zhong ri zhangzheng shi*) (Taipei: Scooper Press, 1973), p.402.

⁴⁰ Lowell Dittmer and Samuel Kim (eds.), *China Quest for National Identity* (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1993).

understood to benefit the Korean people as if they were a part of the Chinese Under-heaven. Therefore, the official discourse on China's intervention was not merely the familiar national interest argument but that helping Koreans was considered helping "neighbor," and helping neighbor was "to protect families and the nation" from imperialism.⁴¹ In the Chinese Under-heaven, there were no sovereign borders to separate one people from another; all were subjects of the rulers' concern. There were no such things as territoriality, sovereignty or national borders. While the sovereignty principle assumes the lack of order among sovereignties, Daoist regards for people were universally applied norms regardless of which land territory was in question. Political campaigns and counter-revolutionary movements were always associated with involvements in war,⁴² indicating the intimate relationship between the rectification of public consciousness and national defense. Zhou Enlai's celebration of the victory of land reform during the Korean War signified that the war was and, perhaps, had to be on two fronts simultaneously. The purpose of any mass rally during the Korean War was necessarily against both imperialism and feudal land ownership:

The Chinese Voluntary Troops... have pursued the [American troops] from the Yalu back to the 38th Parallel... the land reform movement... has been the most comprehensive and complete one in the Chinese revolutionary history... and has included ninety million agricultural population, the national militia has developed [to recruit] twelve million and eight hundred thousand people... [and] a great victory has been achieved in oppressing the domestic anti-revolutionary struggle.⁴³

Chinese national identity is not always a product of sovereign territory. In the sense that the display of military strength does not serve to protect national borders, national defense cannot be a tool of state

⁴¹ The Headquarter of the Chinese People Opposing America, Assisting Korea Movement (ed.), *The Great Opposing American, Assisting Korea Movement (weida de kang mei yuan chao yundong)* (Beijing: New China Bookstore, 1954), pp.36-37.

⁴² Melvin Gurtov and Byng-Moo Hwang, *China under Treat* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp.142, 156.

sovereignty. No doubt have the Chinese accepted the Western discourses of national defense and seem to treat national territory as an intrinsic element of national identity; yet between the lines, the logic has been modified to be Chinese. For example, Chinese national leaders proclaim that they would rather lose thousands of troops than give up one inch of their land and that they would sacrifice and bleed one after another to protect territory.⁴⁴ This seems an intensified version of the rationality of the sovereign state. National territory should never be absolute but fluid in accordance with the nation's capacity as well as the choice of its citizens.

To further elaborate, territory is absolute for the Chinese when dealing with subversion, real or fabricated. The uncompromising criterion is to show one's wholehearted devotion to Chinese nationalism. This does not imply anything essential about Chinese territoriality ready to be protected;⁴⁵ rather it is some territorially based anti-foreignism that produces and reproduces nationalist narratives for the citizens of new Republic. Yet there exists many instances whereby the Chinese gave up territory without feeling inferior, or gained legitimacy despite a retreat (discussed later). Both absoluteness and casualness in the Chinese approach to territorial integrity imply the ultimate insufficiency of territory in maintaining the Chinese state identity. In other words, the emphasis on people's hearts distracts concerns for defense of specific territories. The discourse of national defense is far more important than the achievement of national defense.

Given that Chinese moral incorruptibility is all-compassing, preoccupation with territorial integrity would look awkward if not self-contradictory. The selfless propensity dictates a disdain for trivial battles over land. However, when the Chinese need to signal their willingness to sacrifice for the cause of nationalism, the national defense of a seemingly worthless land may become absolute; the occasional casualness, on the other hand, implies China's transcendence over secular

⁴⁴ Reihuan Li (1992), quoted in the *United Daily* (October 30) (Taipei).

⁴⁵ See Dru Gladney, "Ethnic Identity in China," in William Joseph (ed.), *China Briefing, 1994* (Boulder: Westview, 1995), pp.171-192.

issue of state sovereignty. Sacrifice as well as transcendence stress humanity and morality over territorial integrity. These ethics frustrate many a Western defense watcher of China, as one experienced observer of Chinese national defense even claims that there is virtually no rule exists to explain Chinese defense behavior.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ For example, see Gerald Segal, *Defending China* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).

Non-territorial Defense Thinking

Historical incidents show that territorial security was not a priority in any Emperors' battle to win people's heart. On the contrary, a relatively flexible approach to the acquisition and relinquishing of territory was considered in line with moral outlook. What worried the Chinese most involves typically symbolic issues related to the Emperors' place vis-à-vis barbarians. The notion of defense was a matter of moral defense, instead of national defense as such. Failure to appreciate this non-territoriality of Chinese defensive behavior may lead an expert to misinterpret a moral episode as a rational offensive initiative.⁴⁷

As early as in the 17th century, for example, China's Qing dynasty yielded a large quantity of land to Czarist Russia, and a missionary who cared little about China's territorial integrity carried out the negotiations. Emperor Kangxi, considered one of the very few expansionist leaders in Chinese history, relinquished the land easily to Russia, though. Later in the 19th century, Emperor Daoguang yielded to the British the island of Hong Kong and agreed to open five trading ports for the sole purpose of placating the "barbarians" so as to limit their activities to the periphery of China. Upon signing the Treaty of Nanjing honoring all the above concessions, Guangxu forgot his earlier instruction to expel the barbarians or his later wish to renovate China's navy. Compared with face-saving, the loss of territory or of sovereignty was really an nonexistent issue, as he instructed:

if the barbarians show regret, [we] can take the opportunity to enlighten [them]... As to trade, we have never rejected it, as to begging for peace, you have never mentioned, if [you] would like to think of this idea [of peace], I will let you accomplish

⁴⁷ See Alastair Ian Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Great Strategy in Ming China* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) and his critics in *Journal of Asian Studies* 56, 3 (August 1997): 769-773.

[peace].⁴⁸

The heated issue which led to the 1860 invasion of Beijing by the British-French allied forces was unambiguously the right of the “barbarians” to station diplomats in Beijing, a right Emperor Xianfeng found extremely difficult to accept. Having known perfectly well that he would lose and had actually fled before the defense of Beijing ever started, he would still rather be defeated than simply grant their wish. In fact, however, with weak artillery, small numbers and the onset of winter, the Allied forces would have been in trouble if serious resistance had been mounted. The walls of Beijing were as much as 40 feet high and 60 feet thick while the Chinese forces were still potentially formidable. The capture of thirty-seven Allied hostages by the Chinese could have been a portent of things to come. The escape of the emperor, who ordered the fight but refused to win, simply turned the balance of power through the collapse of Chinese morale. Obviously Xianfeng's willingness to fight had little to do with the chance of victory, but with the position that the “barbarians” should not enter the heart of the dynasty on an equal footing.

Equally dramatic was the Sino-French war in 1885 wherein China refused to yield to France its protectorate status over Vietnam. The exchange of fire between the two warring parties in Vietnam, Taiwan and along the China's coast afforded the French forces virtually no advantage at all. China then decided to yield its sovereign position in Vietnam to France in order to preserve their then existing achievement of having not been defeated. The emperor who was worried that the French would revenge their earlier defeats, instructed the officials:

If... we do not take advantage of the victory and withdraw... the whole design will be destroyed... War affairs cannot be totally controlled... Now that [we] have won, why should we not plan the ending... [You] should make a cease fire and withdraw, without delay in order to avoid other changes.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ *Records of Barbarian Affairs (duban yiwu shimo)*, Daoguang years 54: 1.

⁴⁹ Chuanli Luo, “The Origin and Development of Sino-French Warfare,” in Chinese

The land of Vietnam clearly held less importance than the status of the Dynasty. In other words, to prove that China continued to occupy a superior position, the moral emperor bestowed upon the French a land toward which he should have had no concern.

The Sino-Japanese war that occurred a decade later witnessed the most humiliating defeat in Chinese modern history. For the Chinese could not imagine themselves defeated by the “dwarf” Japanese, especially since, if the Chinese “treated them well,” the Korean people would assist in “isolating the Japanese troops” and the Chinese troops “could go back and forth at will.”⁵⁰ Despite the military advisor Li Hongzhang's urge to avoid military confrontation, the court scorned any diplomatic resolution lest this would damage China's national dignity and even began to suspect Li Hongzhang's intention. It was believed that if the court called back the diplomatic delegation, “the national face can be saved and the people's will can be solidified.”⁵¹ None worked in the end and China was compelled to yield Taiwan to Japan. The dynastic court, however, expressed no eagerness in gaining the land back in the aftermath. Instead, the court focused on other events, conceding to other imperial powers some treaty rights and treaty ports in order to secure their support for collusion between Empress Dowager and court officials to install a new emperor. Apparently, even after the dynasty's repeated defeats in the past four decades, the loss of sovereign integrity still proved an inadequate criterion in judging the Empress's legitimacy.

She and her followers became furious and frustrated after knowing that all imperialist powers supported incumbent Emperor Guangxu, who supported reform, and eventually forced her to abort the installation of a new emperor. Projecting its fury, the court then utilized the Boxers to summon them in killing all “barbarians.” When the Boxers entered Beijing, the indulged Empress could not resist appealing to the hearts of

History Association Editors (eds.), *The Sino-French War (zhong fa zhangzheng)* (Shanghai: New Knowledge Publication, 1955).

⁵⁰ “Archive of Telegram in the Guangxu Period,” in C.L. Yang (ed.), *Collected Literature on the Sino-Japanese War (zhong ri zhangzheng wenxian hui bian)* (Taipei: Tingwen Bookstore, 1973), July 17, 20 (Guangxu year).

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, December 10, 20 (Guangxu year).

the People under Heaven and, in 1900, declared war on all powers having treaty relations with China. This took place without any particular incident occurring between China and the world. In fact, no war plan or even goal was announced.⁵² With fifty times more soldiers and the powerful Krupp cannons, which could have easily decimated the foreign legation walls in one day but fired seven symbolic shots only on the last day, the whole event seemed to be a drama of showing China's displeasure with foreign intrusion. As an on-site observer recalled:

There had been suspicions that the war against the Legations had not been carried out in a whole-hearted manner. Casualties on the foreign side were high and disturbing but when compared to the number of rounds fired by the Chinese, they were incomprehensibly low. It almost seemed, at times, as if the Imperial soldiers at least were merely putting up a show of attack and seemed content to make things uncomfortable for the foreigners.⁵³

Before the Allied Forces could catch them, Empress Dowager took Guangxu to Xian. Upon leaving, she did not forget to execute those who once cautioned her during the court debate and called them "betrayers." The contrast of the reluctant attacks on the Legations and resolute execution of one's own loyal officials revealed most vividly where China's enemy resided. This anxiety toward an internal enemy has remained till today and reduced national defense efforts against the external imperialist intrusion to no avail. In the aftermath of the Tiananmen Massacre, a contemporary writer provides a new, long list of internal enemies, all famous writers of the 1980's, and concludes:

We execute the policy of reform and openness and strengthen the interactions and exchanges with all the countries in the world.

⁵² Chuanli Luo, "On the National Crisis in the Year of Genzi" (Genzi guo bian ji) in Y.Ah (ed.), *Collected Literature on the Events in the Year of Genzi* (Genzi shibian wenxue ji) (Beijing: Chinese Bookstore, 1959): 945-958.

⁵³ Lancelot Giles, *The Siege of the Peking Legations: A Diary* (Nedlands: University of West Australian Press, 1970), p.88.

This has positively affected the economic growth and all-round development in our country. But, international reactionary forces take advantage of the opportunity to infiltrate political, thought, cultural areas and engage in their conspiracy under the banner of friendly cooperation and through various channels. They want to win the war without fighting.⁵⁴

Before the official outbreak of the second Sino-Japanese war in 1937, the Kuomintang regime had struggled to avoid armed conflict with Japan, whose troops had first taken Manchuria and then moved into Northern China. The KMT wanted to eliminate the Communist power contenders before engaging in any premature warfare with Japan. Obviously, Japan's invasion did not fundamentally challenge the legitimacy of the government. In fact, the KMT continued to negotiate for a cease-fire even after the government had officially announced the beginning of the war of resistance. Moreover, the pursuit of cease-fire did not depend upon the return of the territory previously taken by the Japanese troops!⁵⁵

The repeated defeats and setbacks of the KMT troops did not invite substantive criticism concerning the government's capacity for leadership. The regime specifically called on the citizens to resist Japan by building a "Great Wall of people's hearts." Further wartime losses seemed ironically to consolidate the regime's legitimacy. The confidence of the government rose after the bombardment of Pearl Harbor since China has now been declared a formal member of the Allies. This confidence did not fade even though Japan continued to dominate on the battlefield for the years after. In fact, the KMT's effort to take the city of Changsha illustrated the symbolic function of territory in China's state-building process. Believing that the whole world scrutinized this front, the KMT felt it imperative to seize the city although it was unable to defend it later. Chiang Kaishek felt that the battle over Changsha was "watched by the whole world" and thus pushed his troops to achieve a victory "at any sacrifice." Upon

⁵⁴ Hua Yuan, *Cristal Lesson from Bitter History (tong shi ming jian)* (Beijing: Beijing Press, 1991), p.139.

⁵⁵ See Wei-kuo Chiang, *The History of National Revolution (guomin geming shi)* (Taipei: Liming, 1979), pp.7-8.

recovering the city, he celebrated that “our supreme moral and spiritual authority has been established now.”⁵⁶ Becoming a showcase battle decades after the war, the simple performance of taking Changsha, losing, re-taking and again losing it would supposedly demonstrate the courage and the determination of the Chinese troops. The emphasis lies not upon taking the territory, but displaying the unity of “people's hearts” through sacrifice.

Despite the dramatic increase of fighting morale and capacity after 1949, the People's Liberation Army certainly disregarded territorial occupation as a central war objective. Several times, the PLA enacted the drama of unilateral withdrawal after gaining ground in the first series of skirmishes.⁵⁷ The Western military certainly never encountered the philosophy that all the bloody sacrifice results in telling the opponent that there never had been any territorial ambition. It was difficult to imagine that the military in the West would return the land they capture simply for the sake of sending political signals. Once arriving at a place, it would be extremely difficult to get troops out, even though they were not there to procure territories. For the Chinese, the psychological capability to oscillate between taking and relinquishing land indicates moral supremacy.

The PLA's first display of this approach involved the Korean War. The PLA intervened in the war in the guise of the People's Voluntary Troops to indicate the appearance of peace between the Chinese and American state and the abdication of territorial ambition for the Chinese. The initial stage of contacts effectively pushed the US troops back to the Pacific, yet the Chinese armies did not pursue. Instead, the PLA unilaterally ceased fire. The Chinese communicated the message that they could win, but would not take advantage and only acted purely defensively. One veteran told me a story of PLA's self-restraint which he still cannot understand today. He was involved in a rescue mission offshore during the Korean War, but unfortunately was stuck due to a

⁵⁶ Wu, op. cit., pp.796, 798.

⁵⁷ Steve Chan, “Chinese Conflict Calculus and Behavior,” *World Politics* 30 (April 1978): 391-410.

mechanical problem of the boat. When they were eventually towed away by another rescue craft, the Chinese began to shell the water behind them. I think this indicates a typical Chinese style of confrontation, aiming at showing determination and fearlessness while executing self-restraint at the same time, leaving both sides room to compromise without losing dignity.

The Korean war was fought in the name of defending China's national security. The official discourse was rarely seen in this light, though. Compared with at best scarcely mentioned national security, the "people-" related discourse dominated throughout. In other words, the Korean War could not be understood in the Chinese mind as a war to protect the sovereign order, but a war between people and the imperialist, as Zhou Enlai declared:

The Chinese people can never tolerate foreign invasion nor allow the imperialist to invade our neighbor at will without responding. Whoever intends to liquidate and destroy the interests of our one-fourth of the human race and imagination he can arbitrarily resolve any issue in the Orient related to China will break and bleed his head.⁵⁸

Not only did people in China look unified despite political purges which went on in the country side, in churches as well as in factory, but also the Chinese and the Korean people were claimed to be unified:

No Asian affairs can be solved without the participation of the Chinese people. It is impossible to solve the Korean problem without the participation of its closest neighbor, China... North Korea's friends are our friends. North Korea's defense is our defense. North Korea's victory is our victory.⁵⁹

It is the American imperialist Other that had helped foster this

⁵⁸ Enali Zhou, "A Report to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference," in *The Great Opposing America, Assisting Korea Movement*, op. cit., pp.25, 27.

⁵⁹ Allen Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu* (New York: Macmillan, 1960), p.84.

cross-sovereignty brotherhood and the national security issue for China could no longer be national per se. It is a statement of lofty relations among all Chinese people, Asian people, and people of the world.

In 1958, Mao ordered the shelling of the offshore islands defended by the US-supplied KMT troops. The purported purpose was to cut the supply line to these islands. While this failed to be accomplished, Mao decided to extend the engagement by symbolic shootings every other day. No intention to seize the islands existed, for simple act of shelling served to symbolically continue the Chinese Civil War between Beijing and Taipei.⁶⁰ Similarly, the Taipei authorities decided to heavily guard the island, which from the American point of view remained unimportant for the execution of Containment to suggest its intention to eventually retake the Mainland. The occupation of the offshore islands never was the real issue. In fact, in a dramatic statement given by Marshall Peng Dehuai, a two-week cease fire was offered to the Quemoy troops in exchange for their agreement not to depend on the US 7th Fleet for logistical support:

We hope that the authorities on Taiwan respect [Chinese] nationalism. The Quemoy supply problem can be solved by yourself. You should not ask the Americans for protection... Any Chinese with national dignity would never ask a foreigner to represent him to solve his own domestic problem.⁶¹

Another more intriguing offer was to supply Quemoy from the Chinese side:

You should not be overly dependent [on the Americans] under their roof and let people [i.e. the Americans] take away all your power of leverage. I have ordered the Fujian front not to shell Quemoy's airfield, Lairo Bay's port and shore or [supply] ships

⁶⁰ Thomas Stolper, *China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Island* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1985)

⁶¹ Spokesman of the Foreign Ministry, "A Declaration Concerning the Stopping of Shelling of Quemoy," *The People's Republic of China Foreign Relations Documents 1958* (*zhonghua renmin gongheguo duiwai guanxi wenjianji*) (Beijing: World Knowledge, 1959), p.178.

on odd days, so that the civilian and military comrades on Quemoy... can consolidate their long run defense... If you [feel] that this is insufficient, as long as you ask [us] we can provide supplies [to you].⁶²

While the statement was insufficient to win Taiwanese people's heart, it was a try nonetheless and it was far off the track of national defense thinking from a Western point of view in the English literature. The dramatic nature of these announcements could not be clearer here: the whole point of shelling was a demonstration that Taiwan was a part of China and China was daring enough to defend against US intervention even without the Soviet back up.

In 1969, the PLA exchanged fire with the Soviet patrols on Zhenbao Island. The conflict reaffirmed Mao's claim that China was a true world revolutionary, whom both superpowers treated as their enemy. The contact on the islands ceased as the PLA pushed out the Soviet patrols and then unilaterally withdrew. No one could doubt the Chinese claim that they dared to oppose the Soviet social imperialist. At the CCP's 9th National Congress, Lin Biao reported that China was the true world revolutionary for it was China's honor to fight both superpowers at the same time.⁶³

It is China's honor that the American imperialists and the Soviet revisionists always want to isolate China. We should be well prepared to fight early and vehemently with them. [We should be prepared] to fight a regular war with them and also to fight a great nuclear war with them.

There was apparently no intention to keep the Zhenbao Island after the successful initial seizure of it. To highlight the Soviet Union as the most formidable enemy of China assumed the utmost importance in this

⁶² Dehuai Peng, "A Letter to the Taiwanese," October 25, 1958, *ibid.*, p.182.

⁶³ *Collection of Original Materials Concerning the Disputes Between Bandits and Russia (fei e douzheng yuanshi ziliao huibian)* Vol.14 (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 1971), pp.27-28.

conflict. In fact, Zhou Enlai was ready to make peace with the Soviet Union. The lesson seemed to be that concern about sovereign territory does not explain Chinese national defense behavior, but indeed it provides a clue as to how to resolve conflict once broken out. Thus Zhou Enlai and Soviet Premier Kosygin met eight months later to reach a cease-fire understanding where Zhou stressed the familiar five principles of peaceful coexistence,⁶⁴ the first of which was to respect sovereignty. Sovereignty as an expedience provided China breathing room, but rarely motivated specific defense initiatives.

The tactics of unilateral withdrawal appeared also in the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and in the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979. In the former case, the PLA themselves withdrew 40 kilometers after forcing the Indian troops back 40 kilometers; while in the latter, the PLA withdrew after reaching the city of Liangshan. The PLA demonstrated its ability to defend the territory in 1962 and its determination to punish Vietnam in 1979 while at the same time proving its lack of territorial ambition. This logic presupposes that the war must have originated from the other side's territorial intent. In the Indian case especially, the notion of sovereignty as a solution rather than motivation cannot be clearer. For the Chinese, the war was imposed upon them, not asked by them. Obviously they felt no anxiety facing the ambiguity in the Sino-Indian border lines, therefore unilateral withdrawal did not hurt Chinese feeling, either. China's willingness to tolerate the lack of clear sovereignty is considered a good place to start building China's image :

We did not take advantage of military victory, force a solution, or revoke the peaceful consultation approach... Regardless of India's refusal to negotiate, we ceased fire unilaterally... no one could be made to believe that China wanted to invade India, no Indian people could be made to believe that Chinese people wanted to fight them... To use all possible means of propaganda and to treat various international occasions seriously... allows

⁶⁴ See Huiping Gong, "The Airport Meeting of Zhou Enlai and Kosygin and Its Lessons," in Pei (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp.170-178.

the people of the world to understand Chinese people...⁶⁵

Similarly, the three missile exercises the PLA launched in 1995 and 1996 in the Taiwan Straits actually suggests no intention to occupy Taiwan as long as the exercises could rebuff any potential foreign intervention. The exercises propounded the political statement that indeed Taiwan belongs to China; occupation would have proved meaningless or even damaging because an armed invasion would only suggest that the Taiwanese people's heart was no longer on the side of the Chinese. Accordingly, it is critical for the PLA to demonstrate that the missile exercises were not aimed at the Taiwanese people. China subsequently repeated the claim a number of times that the PLA's job in the Taiwan Strait was to prevent foreign intrusion. In a dramatic statement made in 1995, China's President Jiang Zemin declared that the Chinese would not fight the Chinese, presumably warning against separatists on Taiwan to think twice before declaring themselves legally no longer Chinese. In fact, the solution Beijing came up with the reunification of China and Taiwan is "one country, two systems," presumably to maintain everything in Taiwan as it is after reunification takes place perhaps providing more room for Taipei to participate in international inter-governmental activities. National defense in terms of the rights to resort to armed solution is thus in no way to enhance Beijing's control over the land of Taiwan; rather, it is simply a statement of national unity, which is ironically preserved by granting a separatist type of autonomy for Taiwan.

In brief, national defense in China is psychological defense. The issue of national defense per se did not exist in past Chinese history. Discussions on strategic defense ultimately concerned one's identification with the ancestor, the prince, the emperor, etc. As a result of their contacts with imperialist invasion, the Chinese only recently began to accept the notion of national defense. Consequently, national defense in modern China embraces nationalism. For Daoguang and Xianfeng, separating the Chinese from the "barbarian" embodied their concept of

⁶⁵ Yixian Xie, *Diplomatic Wisdom and Stratagem: The Theory and Principles of New Chinese Diplomacy* (*waijiao zhihui yu moulyüe: xin zhongguo waijiao lilun yu yuanze*) (Zhengzhou: Henan People's Press, 1993), pp.262-263.

nationalism. For the Empress Dowager, nationalism referred to the gathering of the people's hearts in Beijing; for the KMT, it alludes to national unity. Finally, for the PLA, nationalism relates to anti-imperialism, the forces that had driven its predecessors to care about national defense in the first place.

In other words, national defense is an emotional rather than a rational project. In the past, Chinese Daoist spirit embraced all of Underheaven with no boundary. Only when the Emperor who personified the Daoist spirit was humiliated did national defense become a substitute. At this juncture, the Chinese character became constructed upon China's acquired national territory and not the Emperor. However, territorial sovereignty has proved to be an uncertain element in defining the Chineseness of China, and yet the pursuit of this Chineseness defines the meaning of territorial sovereignty. To establish the lofty and supreme morality of the Chinese character relies on the manipulation of territory. Without the Emperor, there is nonetheless imperialism, which the Chinese mold into an Other/outsider/invader against whom they no longer worried about their identity.

To show China's higher status vis-a-vis outside imperialism, China can usurp the land from imperialist "agents" and then return it as in 1962 and 1979. National defense becomes a mechanism to project nationalist emotion,⁶⁶ which explains the timing of Chinese military action. It often occurs when the Chinese feel internally vulnerable and need to demonstrate their moral supremacy. Since the concept of national defense is associated with the experiences of imperialism and colonialism, it is always ready to explode in face of any reminder of China's past shame. Any reference to national defense in China would therefore signal a rising nationalism. By the same token, however rational or cool-headed they appear, studies of Chinese national defense would in themselves stimulate nationalism in China if they degrade China to a mere territorial identity.

⁶⁶ Chih-yu Shih, *China's Just World: The Morality of Chinese Foreign Policy* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993).

Dependent Nationalism and the Enemy Within

Accordingly, perhaps like all the other incidents of postcolonial nationalism, Chinese nationalism is highly dependent. It is national defense that reproduces an external imperial threat which then solidifies nationalist unity, hence dependent nationalism. Certainly, nationalism follows no scientific mode because the first target is often in the psyche of the Chinese people, who must prove to themselves that they are intrinsically Chinese. This self-justification can be accomplished most efficiently through resisting those that deny them their Chineseness. The psychological dimension of national defense is a vital consideration for defense practitioners.

For example, defense against imperialism has conventionally depended on rallying the masses. One famous case would be Xu Guangjin and Ye Mingchen who mobilized villagers to block the British from entering Canton in the 1850s. Later instances include the Boxers, the student and worker rioters in the beginning of the Republican period, and campaigners in the subsequent anti-Japan, anti-imperialist, and anti-social imperialist rallies throughout the 1970s. What distinguishes these modern mass rallies from historical anti-foreignism is that they arise primarily out of a position of inferiority, as compared to the former attitudes of arrogance and disdain which were generally actualized through some punishing sanctions.

Dependent nationalism promotes revolutionary diplomacy as a form of national defense.⁶⁷ Revolutionary diplomacy was a term first used in the May Fourth Movement and was later adopted by subsequent leaders until 1978, the year that the term finally disappeared from the media. To engage in revolution, there must be an oppressing Other. The existence of this Other is precisely the assumption of every military action of the PLA, who usually describes its action as a “self-defensive counter attack.”⁶⁸

⁶⁷ En-han Li, *Revolutionary Diplomacy Before and After the North Expedition, 1925-1931 (beifa gian hou de geming waijiao, 1925-1931)* (Taipei: The Institute of Modern History, Academic Sinica, 1993).

⁶⁸ In almost every armed conflict, the PLA claimed defense. For one typical example, see

This passive approach suggests that the Chinese self-identity comes from an oppressing Other. Officially, though, the Chinese have adopted a sovereignty discourse in explaining the concept of self-defense counter attack, which can only be territorially-oriented: Self-defense counter attack has passed practical tests of the Sino-Indian, Sino-Soviet border clashes in the 1960s and Xisha Islands and Sino-Vietnamese border clashes of the 1970s. All this fighting occurred when the other side's border patrols invaded the sacred territory of China, killed Chinese border patrols and people, led to bloody incidents, destroyed the peaceful development of border areas, and defied the warning and the protest of the Chinese government and when the Chinese military and people could no longer endure. The style of fighting always aimed at maintaining the territorial integrity by expelling the other side's armed forces, regain the taken territory or engaging in limited counter attack.⁶⁹

While in theory self-defense may appear to be territorially based and is in fact conceptualized as the protection of China's sovereignty, yet the mood is invariably nationalistic which, in turn, is a matter of the individual soldiers' internal rectification in preparation for a final showdown with the imperialist Other. Sovereignty is therefore not to protect individual civil citizens from chaotic external forces, but to protect the Chinese people as a whole at the willing sacrifice of its individual members. The "self" in the "self-defense" discourse is unambiguously the Great Self of nation instead of the "little self" of citizens as one author of the Modern Defense Series puts:

The just war defends our national sovereignty and territorial integrity and defends our national resources and interests of the Chinese nation. Accordingly, our soldiers must be cognizant of their being heirs of Emperor Yan and Emperor Huang, as members of the Chinese nation... To be a People's Liberation

Collected Literature on the PRC Foreign Relations (zhonghua renmin gongheguo duiwai guanxi wenjian ji), 1962 (Beijing: World Knowledge, 1964), p.114.

⁶⁹ Editors (ed.), *The Military Work of Contemporary Chinese Military (dangdai zhongguo junsui de junshi gongzuo)* (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1989), p.460.

Army soldier, one's responsibility is to save the Chinese nation.⁷⁰

With this inspirational note, the worry that individual Chinese may fail to pass this nationalist test inevitably takes place each time when there is reform to enlist foreign capital, technology, or human resources.

The predicament of dependent nationalism is that there exists a strong element of self-loathing, a form of frustration caused by the realization of unwanted characteristics inside of one's identity. This self-hatred stems from the understanding that imperialist cultural projects were built into Chinese sovereign establishments long before China had borders to be defended. The thriving of a sovereign China depends on merchants who can bring in capital from imperialist countries, scientists who study there, the military who purchase weapons there, and institutionalists who introduce Western systems to China. Whatever granted China its sense of glory becomes shockingly irrelevant in domain of the modern sovereign state; instead, all this past splendor was conceived of as a soon discarded legacy to be jettisoned if China wished to eventually turn modern.

Self-hatred contains almost inexpressibly subtle ironic overtones.⁷¹ On the one hand, compradors, who facilitate the import of Western civilization to develop the Chinese state, feel superior to their fellow "primitive" citizens. On the other hand, they face their own indispensable inferiority toward their Western masters and a heightened uneasiness about China's dependence on Western power. Thus in some situations these people would like to distance themselves from the less developed China, yet they still hate their helpless attachment to foreign forces and seek self-dignity from indigenous sources.

Taiwanese leaders keenly reflect this ambiguity. With fifty years

⁷⁰ Zhongxin Liu, *The Business of Blood and Fire (xie yu huo de shiye)*, *Modern National Defense Series (xiandai guofang congshu)* (Chengdu: Sichuan Education Press, 1991), pp.173-174.

⁷¹ G.C. Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" in C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (eds.), *Marxism and Interpretation of Culture* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988).

under Japanese colonial rule and another fifty years under American tutorship, Taiwan is perhaps one of the most modern regions in Chinese cultural areas. On the one hand, leaders in Taiwan look down upon China as a “feudal, underdeveloped, authoritarian, retarded” country;⁷² on the other hand, they possess a sense of self-pity for not being fully recognized by the United States and Japan from whom they have acquired their perspectives on China.⁷³

However, the number of compradors inexorably increases. They are at best partial compradors because they also resist foreign influences at times. But because to resist foreign influences must also means to resist oneself, this action makes people generally frustrated. Similarly, to despise the underdeveloped also implies a certain scorn toward one's own cultural legacy. All Chinese national leaders are entrapped in this predicament, for they need to occasionally remind their citizens of China's backwardness thus causing amongst them anxiety over their indigenous identities. They also must mobilize nationalism to ensure that Western value systems do not completely overtake People's Republic, in the process confusing those engaged in China's pursuit of status under the Western sovereign system. The PLA is affected deeply by this self-hatred. Facing Taiwanese leaders' claim that the recognition and promotion of Taiwan's separate sovereign status in the world is a Chinese achievement, a PLA Daily editorial explains this is not true for people in China because Taiwan independence would be a “bitter split of the Chinese people,” hence no achievement. For the PLA, which “is marching toward modernization,” they must stop Taiwan independence for the sake of all the people in the world,

Experiencing a bitter past, fed up with predicaments, the Chinese nation is about to enter the new century. In the age all countries pursue peace and development and at the moment the Chinese government is ready to resume its sovereign rule over Hong Kong and Macoy, it becomes more urgent to resolve the Taiwan

⁷² Lee Teng-hui's inauguration speech in *China Times* (May 20, 1996): 2.

⁷³ See the *Symposium of the Conference on China Policy (min jin dang zhongguo zhengce yantaohui)* (Taipei: Democratic Progressive Party, February 13-15, 1998).

problem and achieve the unification of the mother land. A united, strong, wealthy China can make greater contributions to peace and progress of the world.⁷⁴

The PLA still cannot decide whether it is a modern, Westernizing or a Chinese traditional establishment. The arts and cultural products in the 1990s celebrate PLA's victory in the Civil War much more frequently than it does other wars the PLA had fought successfully. These films portrayed the defeated KMT as feudalistic. The clear message is that the PLA has jettisoned its past legacy and become truly a people's military. The principles of a people's war are concurrently witnessing revision. For example, the PLA no longer advocates the tactics of mingling with the enemy in face of tactical nuclear weapon, nor do they promote an earlier and greater nuclear war than a later, smaller one. Modernization of national defense, in particular nuclear technology, is called for today.⁷⁵ In particular, as Russia is no longer a threat, the PLA quickly develops the ability to fast deploy troops to peripheral areas, including Taiwan. This, ironically, may limit its sovereign ability as one Western observer notes:

China's global agenda bears significantly upon its concerns about its territorial integrity, and particularly over Taiwan. China must put considerable effort into maintaining global support for the one-China policy. Maintaining this support constrains its ability to influence international issues and to take sides in international disputes.⁷⁶

Moreover, modernization conveys the concept of cost-efficiency, which, in turn, shifts attention to profit making.⁷⁷ The PLA begins to earn

⁷⁴ Editorium of *PLA Daily*, reprinted in *People's Daily (Renmin Ribao)* (January 31, 1996).

⁷⁵ Shih-min Chen, *The origin and the Evolution of China's Nuclear Strategy (Zhonggong hewu zhanlyue de xingcheng yu zhangbian)*, Master Thesis (Graduate Institute of Politic Science, National Taiwan University, 1992) (Taipei).

⁷⁶ Stuart Harris, "The PRC's Quest for Great Power Status," presented at An Internaitional Conference on the PRC After the Fifteenth Party Congress, Taipei, (February 20, 1998).

⁷⁷ Jorn Brommelhorster and John Frankenstein, *Mix Motives, Uncertain Outdomes: Defense Conversion in China* (Boulder: Lynner Rienner, 1997).

money by producing market-oriented goods for both civilian and international military buyers. While modernization demands the Chinese to learn lessons from the capitalist societies, it is nonetheless ironic to see the PLA, which once overthrew the old bureaucratic capitalism of the KMT regime, now lead the way to capitalism. The political attitude of the PLA has profoundly changed.

First of all, the PLA needs to perform conservatively in the political field in order to distract attention away from their profiteering policy. No one doubts the PLA's loyalty to socialism after the Tiananmen massacre without appearing extremely politically awkward and naive. This facade allows more room for the PLA to maneuver in the commercial area. Yet with its mission of anti-imperialism, the PLA would inevitably be most sensitive to signs of imperialist influences in China, including the commercialization of the military, for example, to run businesses with military resources for the sole purpose of generating profits. The PLA, more than anyone else, needs to establish that imperialist collusion with its agents in China would eventually prove futile. Therefore, the PLA would have to treat this colluding agent in China seriously. Indeed one author of the aforementioned National Defense Series underscores the dangerous tendency within China itself to loosen up and warns that "the real enemy is ourselves" for the "pursuit of individual interests" has gradually replaced "concerns over national survival and crisis."⁷⁸

War preparation and war form one single thing. The only way to avoid losing without fighting is self-strengthening... To self-strengthen is to transcend ourselves and to reform constantly. Only thorough reform can dangerous elements be controlled, so one noteworthy international phenomenon in the tranquillity of "soft war" is that social systems of various kinds as well as states at different levels of development understand themselves

⁷⁸ Yuchen Cui, *The Nascent Contention in Fighting for the Soft Border Lines* (*zheng duo ran bian jiang de xin jiaozhu*), *Modern National Defense Series* (Chengdu: Sichuan Education Press, 1996).

more deeply.⁷⁹

The PLA reassures itself regarding its capability of self-control by locating and controlling the colluding agents. Taiwan has become a perfect target as many foreign influences are using Taiwan as a leverage against China, and Taiwanese leaders enjoy boosting Taiwan's success at Western-style development. Accusing Taiwan of alienation from China serves as a reminder of Japanese colonial legacy in China since Taiwan was Japan's colony for fifty-one years.⁸⁰ This action both satisfies the anti-imperial anxiety and evokes shame inside the Chinese minds. Inward defense in regard to Taiwan is thus a psychological as well as a national defense, guaranteeing China a chance to cleanse Taiwan, as Japan's postcolonial base, while still including it as part of China's Underheaven. The PLA leaders continue to see Taiwan issue as a matter of "people's heart;" any move against it would be "a serious emotional blow to the Chinese people."⁸¹ While sovereignty seems to be an issue, it never really is since, in the Chinese discourse the sovereignty argument is not to defend against enemies outside but to cleanse imperialism from the inside. It is more emotional than rational:

If... those endeavoring to enlist Western support are determined no matter what [to pursue independent statehood]... Chinese government and people will not let them be. The entire history of China has demonstrated that whoever splitting the mother land would eventually become a historical criminal... This is a matter of Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, directly in relation to the feeling of 1.2 billion Chinese people.⁸²

This self-loathing formed during China's encounter with imperialism and colonialism. It is an inexpressible feeling in Chinese as well as in English due to the poverty of language concerning the hybrid nature of

⁷⁹ Ibid., pp.206-207

⁸⁰ See Jiaquan Li, "On the Root and its Outlet of Li Tenghui's Sense of Pity" (*li denghui beiai de genyou ji qi chulu*), *Straits Review (haixia pinglun)* 47 (November 1994).

⁸¹ Haotian Chi, Vice Chairman of Central Military Commission, quoted in *Renmin Ribao* (oversees edition) (June 11, 1996).

⁸² Chi Haotian quoted in *Renmin Ribao* (December 12, 1996).

postcolonial thinking. Instead of being a foundation of the Chinese state, territorial sovereignty at best reverts to a tool of identity politics. Fluctuating positions swing from emphasizing territory in one instance to giving it up in another. These instances all make a political statement concerning China's commitment to values at a level much higher than the concept of territorial sovereignty entails. Accordingly, inward defense is not as simple as a regime's oppression of its own people;⁸³ rather, it is a summons of the people to unite together in the name of the state.⁸⁴ In essence, however, a deeper reading may indicate that the state is never as important as the nation and territorial sovereignty rarely is more important than the unity of the Chinese people, which usually takes priority when a discourse, such as the following, ends:

Frequently suffering foreign invasion, the Chinese people cherish state sovereignty and territorial integrity very much, thus the Chinese people, all of whom carry long-lasting patriotic tradition, must fulfill the unification of China. The fundamental condition for a resolution of the Taiwan issue is to do a good job of China's own ventures... Let the Chinese people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait unite together and work together to fulfill the great engagement of China's unification.⁸⁵

It should be noted that this obsession with national unity informs the meaning of sovereignty, not the other way around. Sovereignty is at best a pretext for China to preclude Western intervention when treating imperialist elements inside of the Chinese people. It is clear that the PLA leaders regard the Taiwan issue as a Japanese colonial legacy. They cannot understand why the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party

⁸³ Joseph B. Underhill-Cady, *Doing Battle with Death*, Ph.D dissertation University of Michigan (Ann Arbor, 1995).

⁸⁴ According to Ellis Joffe, the Chinese military's self-image "is inseparable from the pride and patriotism," and until Jiang Zemin demonstrates that he is a worthy standard bearer of Chinese nationalist aspirations... the military will tend to view him with some suspicion and presumably consider it necessary to keep a close watch..." in his "The PLA and politics," presented at An International Conference on the PRC After the Fifteenth Party Congress, Taipei, (February 19, 1998).

⁸⁵ Li Peng quoted in *Renmin Ribao* (January 31, 1996).

could “work together to fight Japan during World War II while people in Taiwan today can feel comfortable with a Japanese colonial legacy?” If the Chinese people are to thrive in the world, this postcolonial drive to split China “must be stopped”.⁸⁶ Worse is that “international as well as internal forces will laugh at the Chinese people” if their richest province (i.e. Taiwan) “flies away.” These internal forces would include “separatist movements in Xinjiang and Tibet.” The Chinese government would have no alternative to a civil war.⁸⁷

The predicament nonetheless continues in that such psychological defense is meaningful only to the extent an un-Chinese target can be identified, be it feudalism, liberalism, or imperialism. It is always opposition to something that defines national defense in China. The importance of this “anti” defense may further grow in the 21st century because the public can no longer identify Chairman Mao or Comrade Deng, as the personification of Chineseness. With globalization and China's reform increasing Western influences in China, the simultaneous pressure for stronger inward defense necessarily expands. Then, the determination to command seemingly uncontrollable territory and the willingness to relinquish those already under control would likely form a symbiotic dyad deep into 21st century China.

Conclusion

In light of the military agreement coming out of the Clinton-Jiang Zemin Summit of October 1997 and June 1998 and a series of mutual visits by high-ranking military officials between China and the United States in 1998, it would seem that China is ready to enter the sovereign world with a style typical and familiar to most Western states. For example, Beijing has agreed to halt its missile sales to Iran, established a

⁸⁶ Huaqing Liu, Central Military Commission, quoted by *Renmin Ribao* (August 31, 1995).

⁸⁷ Jiashu Huang, *Can Taiwan Become Independent? (taiwan neng duli ma?) Strategic Studies Series of International Strategic Research Foundation* (Haikou.: South Sea Press, 1994), p.278.

hot line with Washington, and cease calling for the withdrawal of all the US troops from Asia. However, I take all these dialogues as the Chinese maneuvering to ameliorate the "China threat" image so pervasive in the Western media since the 1990s⁸⁸.

Taking a hundred-year perspective will thus result in a quite different interpretation of the developing cooperation between China and the United States. In brief, Beijing's effort to meet some international standards of a responsible sovereign state is perhaps a significant source of pressure on its leaders to keep all the Chinese united. The case in point would be the 15th National Party Congress of October 1997, during which session all news media broadcast how 1.2 billion Chinese have reached an unprecedented unity. The same tone of celebration has continued for over six months at the completion of the final draft of this paper. Ironically, the report of the Party Congress is that China is facing a serious challenge and pressures ahead, and this is the critical moment for the survival of the Party. The celebration of the Party Congress and the calm of Jiang Zemin upon hearing the US human rights criticism of China cannot help but produce an intense mood.

The National Defense Act passed by the National People's Congress of March 1997 may well cause controversy due to its incompatibility with norms of Western sovereign states. For the Western states, inward defense is to prevent imperialist forces from utilizing the so-called liberal settings within the states and thus sabotaging the sovereign order. From the same liberal standpoint, however, China's inward defense is to prevent its citizens from the allurements of Western influences, and thus is disliked by Western observers. Inward defense in China is therefore considered so undemocratic that it defeats the purpose of having sovereignty, which is to protect liberalism from the threat of outside authoritarianism or communism. Ironically, though, inward defense may distract Chinese

⁸⁸ Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, *The Coming Conflict with China* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997); Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Making of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996); for a related discussion see Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross, *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress* (New York: WW Norton, 1997).

from attempting to achieve superpower status.

However, as argued earlier, inward defense exists in all states albeit indirect in Western states. In all the countries in the world, inward defense possesses a colonial, imperial origin. The difference lies in the fact that in the Western, imperialist country, inward defense does not cause self-hatred because the national defense thinkers in the West come from a stratum culturally, ideologically and economically different from the targets of their inward defense. The Chinese defense thinkers and practitioners hold no such fate, for every one of them bears imperial legacy acquired from education, work, the market, and the media. Both anti-feudalism and anti-imperialism lead to self-denial due to the hybrid composition of Chinese national identity.

Since the enemy resides within, it is impossible to speak strictly of territorially oriented national defense. To win people's hearts, the end of Chinese psychological defense, is to deal with these unwanted hybrid influences in the public consciousness inside of everyone's mindset, and is therefore to rectify one's own mind and purify China's national identity. The hybrid influences unfortunately cannot be purified by their very definition. Consequently, any purifying projects would require an external as well as an internal target to project this unwanted self and to conquer or expel it. On the other hand, the Western observers of Chinese national defense are equally, if not more, confused and anxious about China's inward defense. China's defensive action may cross over or stay entirely within sovereign borders, but never focusing only on the territorial borders themselves. The West either views the Chinese as a threat to their sovereign order (when China crosses borders) or to universal civilization (when China stays within borders). The differing responses from the West naturally reinforce the strength of dependent nationalism in China. Under this circumstance, those Chinese who benefit from or enlist Western techniques, values or institutions, including the PLA, must engage in inward defense to prove their purity and identify an external enemy to consolidate their own Chineseness. This self-perpetuating circle, first originated from Western imperialism in China, is the essence of contemporary Chinese national defense.

依賴性的民族主義：近代與現代 中國人國防概念中的領土與人民

石之瑜

中文摘要

人民代表大會通過的國防法，會在外界引起爭議，多半是他不符合一般國家體制的規範，明文界定國家軍隊對自己人民進行軍事行動的法源，但深明近代中國歷史發展的人都應了解，這種向內的國防，正是中國人在文化、宗教方面西化未完全，但卻接受了西方國家的體制，因此而生出的焦慮與沮喪所促成的特殊風格。更何況，西洋國家體制下並非真是槍口一致對外，而是彼等對內的國防具有較大的隱藏性而已。西洋國家體制之內的顛覆因子，是國家建立之後進行殖民主義才引進的，因此比較容易區隔，其中沒有出現母國人民的自恨，只有不同種族與階級之間的對立。中國與其它後殖民國家在建國之前，就已經與帝國主義無所不在的文化工程相接觸，故並不存在絕對本土的領導菁英，則無論反封建或反帝，難免都是在針對自己內在的若干部分進行反抗。

既然是針對自己，就不可能完全受制於領土疆域，而這偏偏又被當代國家體制視為是不理性的行為，而以為中國人的國防對內行使鎮壓，對外溢出疆域，其目的又不像美國那樣，是以維護某個其它國家的疆域，受其邀請而前往干預的，於是就容易變成其他國家，尤其是美國，看成是未來改變國際版圖現狀的主要威脅來源。而這種美國人對中國人想當然耳的定位，在中國人那種依賴性民族主義的角度解讀之下，當然就構成令人不安的反華行徑，則國防體系中的人，一來被迫檢視內部是否有人受蠱惑，二

來急於尋求帝國主義同路人為對象，並打擊之以展現民族振興，從而更被西方看成為一個威脅的主要來源。如此惡性循環形成，厥為國防。

關鍵字：國防 中國 主權 民族主義 後殖民主義；national defense, China, sovereignty, nationalism, postcolonialism

